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One or Several Principals?
Anne Rasmussen
European University Institute, Italy
A B S T R A C T
Since the introduction of the co-decision legislative
procedure, the EU has had the possibility to resort to a
Conciliation Committee made up of representatives from the
European Parliament and the Council to reconcile differ-
ences between the two bodies. This article assesses whether
the members of this committee have an incentive to take
advantage of their ability to present take-it-or-leave-it offers
to their parent bodies by examining whether they are repre-
sentative of their full body and/or whether they represent
other interests inside or outside their legislative body. It
concludes that the EU Conciliation Committee is generally
representative of its parent bodies and that the option to go
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The European Union has developed considerably since its inception and has
increasingly grown to resemble a domestic political system. A crucial step in
this process was the introduction of the bicameral, co-decision legislative
procedure, which enables the European Parliament (EP) and the Council to
meet directly to resolve disagreements in a Conciliation Committee. This
committee can exert a significant influence on the legislative files it reconciles
which typically affect the daily lives of millions of EU citizens. Hence, it has
the potential to suggest compromises that the Council and the EP cannot
amend but have to accept, unless they do not want any new legislation at all.
The members of the Conciliation Committees are not free to do what they
want, but must act within an institutional framework. However, these insti-
tutions do not determine their behaviour because the entire rationale of dele-
gation is to give the delegates a certain freedom of manoeuvre to enable them
to reach a compromise. Hence, the question of who serves on these
committees is important and the legislative bodies have an interest in appoint-
ing delegates whose loyalty lies in defending their position.
Whether they actually succeed in doing so has not been examined in the
very sparse literature on EU Conciliation Committees. This paper conducts
the first study on the composition of EU Conciliation Committees analysing
the actual policy positions of the conciliation delegates. General ideological
scores are used to measure policy positions, and data are included on all the
EP conciliation delegates in the first five years after the entering into force of
the Amsterdam Treaty, i.e. from 1 May 1999 to 30 April 2004. The idea is that
conciliation members can be seen as agents who may serve different princi-
pals, only one of whom is their legislative body as a whole. The key question
that will be answered is thus: In line with whose interests are the conciliation
delegations set up?
I examine only whether the EP appoints conciliation delegates whose
loyalty lies in defending the position of their legislative body. It can be
assumed that the Council delegation has no incentive to try to move legis-
lative outcomes away from what Council would want. Firstly, each member
state is represented in the delegation. Secondly, the members of the delegation
are not politicians (except one1); they are generalist-oriented diplomats (so-
called ‘deputy permanent representatives’), who are not loyal to a particular
sector, but work directly for the foreign offices of the member states. Thirdly,
there is no question of the Council appointing either an extreme or a moderate
delegation according to its strategy in a given circumstance since it is always
represented by the same people in conciliation. The Council delegation is in
many ways the Council. Instead, I focus on the EP’s delegation here. With a
fixed Council delegation, there is no strategic need for the EP to adapt the
composition of its delegation on a case-by-case basis to that of the Council.
European Union Politics 9(1)8 8
Neither is it interested in always appointing an extreme delegation in order
to counterbalance the Council, because Members of Parliament (MEPs) are
likely to react negatively if they were to find out that conciliation delegates
were defending more extreme points than those agreed in the second reading
amendments of the EP. Instead, the EP seeks to appoint a delegation as repre-
sentative of the plenary as possible. This minimizes the risk that the EP plenary
will subsequently reject the conciliation text, which might threaten the credi-
bility of the EP as a responsible partner to the Council in the EU policy process.
The study shows that the EP’s delegation is representative in practice.
Hence, at the same time as the EP party groups have delegates close to their
median position, the delegation is composed in such a way as to be in line
with the interests of the full body. Overall, therefore, the conclusion is that
going to conciliation rarely involves legislative bodies running the risk that
the delegates will act contrary to the interests of their overall bodies. I start
by providing additional information about the EU Conciliation Committee
and reviewing the existing literature about it. Then I set out the theoretical
framework, discuss methodology and data and perform the empirical
analysis.
The EU Conciliation Committee
The 15 areas of Community activity with co-decision in the Maastricht Treaty
have been extended with each new treaty. Currently, the procedure applies
to 40 legal bases of the Treaty and to such crucial policy areas as the internal
market, research policy and anti-discrimination measures. According to
Article 251 of the Treaty, the EU Conciliation Committee is convened in the
co-decision legislative procedure if the Council cannot find the necessary
majority to accept all the second reading amendments of the EP.2 In other
words, if the legislative procedure has completed two readings and there is
still no agreement between the EP and the Council, the third reading may
still be proceeded towards. Here, the Council and the EP delegate responsi-
bility to members from their bodies to reconcile differences in a Conciliation
Committee. This committee consists of an equal and fixed number of rep-
resentatives from the Council and the EP (15 in the period examined). As
stated above, the Council delegation is fixed and includes a representative
from each member state. In the EP, the rules assign quotas to each political
group in the delegation, which largely reflect the composition of the EP 
but leave it up to the groups themselves to decide who they will send to
conciliation (European Parliament, 2005: rule 64). They typically send people
from the relevant standing committee, and it is customary to appoint the
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relevant committee chairperson, the rapporteur and the three EP vice-
presidents responsible for conciliation as delegates. For the Conciliation
Committee to reach agreement, a qualified majority of the Council delegation
and a majority of the EP delegation have to support the deal,3 which then
goes to a final vote in the Council and the plenary of the EP. At this final
stage, a qualified majority is again needed in the Council, whereas a simple
majority (i.e. a majority not of all members of the EP, but merely of those
present during the vote) is sufficient in the EP. In both legislative bodies, this
final vote is a so-called ‘closed’ vote, which means that the legislative bodies
cannot amend the Conciliation Committee compromises but have to accept
them as a whole, the alternative being no new legislation at all.
Conciliation is not always resorted to because efforts are made to save
time and staffing resources by concluding earlier in the legislative process.
However, the significance of having a Conciliation Committee lies not merely
in its actual but in its potential use, and this possibility of going to conciliation
is likely to induce actors to act differently in the initial stages of the procedure
than they would otherwise do. For example, a former head of the EP Con-
ciliation Secretariat has mentioned that the possibility of going to conciliation
in the EU ‘casts a shadow backwards over the whole codecision procedure’
(Shackleton, 2000: 330).
In a recent review of the field of EU legislative politics, McElroy (2007:
187) underlines how ‘the institution of the conciliation committee remains
largely unstudied, no doubt in large part due to its comparative youth, but
it offers a fruitful avenue for further analysis in the future, both qualitatively
and quantitatively’. None of the existing studies has systematically examined
Conciliation Committee composition.
Some address related issues. Garman and Hilditch (1998), for example,
conducted an initial study to show how the conciliation processes work. They
pointed out how the practice has been established of holding informal
meetings in advance of the formal conciliation meetings, and how these have
been decisive in ensuring that agreements could be reached between the co-
legislators. By contrast, Napel and Widgren (2003) and König et al. (2007)
were interested in whether the EP or the Council was likely to have more
influence on the legislative outcome when a file goes to conciliation. Napel
and Widgren (2003) found that, even though the Council and the EP are in a
symmetrical position in the legislative procedure, the Council is still the
dominant legislative body. The Council’s higher majority requirement there-
fore makes it typically the player with the position closest to the status quo,
which gives it an advantage in its negotiations with the EP. König et al. (2007)
conducted the first statistical analysis of ‘who wins?’ in the conciliation
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processes using data from May 1999 to July 2002. Their findings show that
the EP won more often than the Council in their cases, but the Council was
more successful in multidimensional disputes with the EP. König et al. (ibid)
also demonstrate that actors located close to the status quo have a bargain-
ing advantage, that the Council benefits when there is low internal cohesion
in the EP, and that the Commission is not an irrelevant actor in the con-
ciliation processes.
Moreover, some studies point to the importance of the appointment rules,
but do not have systematic data on the policy positions of the conciliation
delegates. Tsebelis and Money’s (1997) study of bicameralism, for example,
sets up a formal model predicting the power of Conciliation Committees in
the systems where they exist. It shows that the legislative outcomes can be
expected to be a function of the composition of these committees and the
bicameral restrictions. Also, in a recent article about how institutionally
constrained the EU conciliation delegates are (Rasmussen, 2005), I point to
the importance of the composition of the EP delegation and include assess-
ments of the likelihood of it being representative based on the appointment
rules. In my view, fairly effective constraints that are in place within both the
Council and the EP ensure that representative conciliation delegates are
appointed and act in accordance with the wishes of their parent bodies.
However, whereas this representativeness rule assigns quotas to each
political group, it does not in itself ensure that only members with certain
ideological views are appointed, as, for example, the delegation-appointing
rule of the US House of Representatives is supposed to do. Here the Speaker
of the House is obliged to appoint no less than a majority ‘who generally
supported the House position’ (Jewell and Patterson, 1986: 169). So we need
to know whether or not the chamber in practice appoints representative
delegations and/or whether or not the conciliation delegates represent other
principals.
Research based on the policy positions of MEPs has recently been
conducted on the composition of the standing committee of the EP. McElroy
(2006) has shown that the committee system is generally proportional to the
EP groups as well as to the share of members from different member states.
Moreover, she shows that committee members are not ideologically different
from the full plenary. Whitaker (2005) has shown that the MEPs’ ideological
position on the committees typically conforms to that of their national party
delegation.
We know that most conciliation delegates originate from these standing
committees (Rasmussen, 2005: 1031), which might lead us to expect that their
respective levels of representativeness is similar. However, there are also
Rasmussen The EU Conciliation Committee 9 1
certain differences between the two that may make it somewhat harder to
ensure representativeness in the conciliation delegation than in the standing
committees. First, the difference in size between the standing committee and
conciliation delegations is likely to make it harder for party leaders to pick a
fully representative delegation to the conciliation delegation than to the
standing committees. Hence, whereas the size of the conciliation delegations
was set at 15 in the period examined, the average size of the standing
committees was more than three times as large. When a party group has just
one or two delegates in conciliation, it may not be able to find members who
represent the interest of the group as a whole. Second, even if it can, other
concerns might lead it to appoint a delegation that is not fully representative.
It is also likely to ensure that the members appointed from the standing
committees have the necessary experience and expertise to conduct nego-
tiations with the Council. Third, these practices mean that certain institutional
figures within the EP (i.e. the three vice-presidents responsible for conciliation,
the rapporteur and the chairperson of the relevant standing committees) are
always appointed as conciliation delegates irrespective of their policy position.
They are supposed to represent the leadership, but this does not mean that
their individual policy positions are necessarily representative of the EP.
We therefore cannot simply assume that the EP conciliation delegation is
representative. This also emerges from interview evidence, where one
practitioner from the EP explained that ‘you can find yourself with certain
interests more heavily represented than others’, especially because ‘people
who are particularly interested in the file will make their voice known inside
their group’. Also an administrator from the Commission pointed out: ‘There
is a discrepancy in the Treaty between the delegation of the Council, which
is absolutely representative of the Council, whereas the delegation of the
Parliament is not necessarily fully representative of the Parliament . . . The
delegation can be skewed in favour of a nationality or an interest group’.4
Multiple conciliation principals?
To predict which potential principals the conciliation delegations are likely to
represent, I here apply the dominant approaches to the study of the US
Congress, i.e. informational, distributional and party theory. Each theory
makes different predictions about the composition of the conciliation del-
egation and thus ultimately about whether conciliation delegations can be
expected to be representative of their chamber or not. Expressed differently,
they draw attention to the different principals (i.e. the chamber, the client
interests of the standing committees and the parties) of whom the conciliation
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delegates may be agents (Maltzman, 1997). Moreover, I have added the possi-
bility that conciliation delegates are representing their fellow national MEPs
within the chamber.
We know from principal–agent theory how delegation problems can arise
when the preferences of the agents deviate from their principal and when the
agent enjoys informational advantages (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991; Strøm,
2003). Here, I examine whether the first of these problems arises if the del-
egates represent other interests (or, in the principal–agent terminology, other
principals), inside or outside the legislative body, that diverge from the
chamber opinion. Figure 1 gives an overview of the empirical implications of
the different theoretical perspectives. It illustrates what they would expect
the distribution of preferences of the conciliation delegates and their parent
bodies to look like and where they would expect their medians to be located
(vertical lines). Although only informational theory was originally tested on
Conciliation Committees, the logic behind distributional theory and party
theory can be relatively easily extended to Conciliation Committees 
as recent US literature has done (Rybicki et al., 2003). However, some
adaptation of the theories is necessary in order to apply them to the EP.
The first theory is the informational view of congressional organization
(Krehbiel, 1991), which would expect Conciliation Committees to be in line
with their chamber. This perspective argues that legislatures are majoritarian,
i.e. a majority of the legislature controls policy and procedural decisions.
Moreover, the actors are uncertain about the relationship between the policies
they choose and their longer-term outcomes. Therefore, legislative organiz-
ation is designed in such a way that uncertainty is reduced with ‘rules and
procedures that provide incentives for individuals to develop policy exper-
tise and to share policy relevant information with fellow legislators’ (Krehbiel,
1991: 5). This means that negotiations are left to decision-makers with
considerable knowledge in particular issue areas and, applied to the concili-
ation sphere, a large proportion of the delegates would be expected to come
from the relevant standing committee that dealt with the file before concili-
ation. At the same time, though, members of the standing and Conciliation
Committees are ensured to be representative of their parent bodies, i.e. the
median position of the conciliation delegation is similar to the median
position of the chamber. As Figure 1 shows, two types of representative
committees can be distinguished. Either the committee can be composed in
such a way that it has similar preferences to the chamber, or it can consist of
heterogeneous preference outliers that are more extreme than the average
chamber member but that balance each other out (for example, a similar share
of environmentalists and industrialists in a conciliation about CO2 emissions).
Moreover, institutional constraints are in place that make sure that legislators
Rasmussen The EU Conciliation Committee 9 3
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Figure 1 The four potential principals.
Notes: The illustrations of the observable, empirical implications of informational, distributional
and party theory are inspired by Maltzman (1997). 
on committees act in accordance with the opinion of the chamber. In this way,
everybody ‘gains from specialization’.
Secondly, following the logic of the distributional view of congressional
organization (Weingast and Marshall, 1988; Shepsle and Weingast, 1987a,
1987b), Conciliation Committees should be in line with those standing
committees that previously dealt with a given file, and therefore ultimately
with the external client interests of these committees. This perspective sees the
main rationale underpinning the legislative organization to facilitate ‘gains
from trade’ between members in an uncertain bargaining environment. This
is done by developing institutions that stabilize their interaction, for example
a committee system that gives members with a special interest in particular
subject areas disproportionate control over the relevant policy, in order to
facilitate that everybody gains from trade. Hence, members are given the
chance to select seats on the standing committees in accordance with their
particular (typically constituency) interests, and the members of the standing
committees dominate the Conciliation Committees in their area (Shepsle and
Weingast, 1987a, 1987b). If we apply the logic of distributional theory to the
area of Conciliation Committees, this would mean that conciliation del-
egations, like the standing committees, consist of a greater number of so-called
‘high demand’ members than the chamber as a whole and are relatively uncon-
strained. As Figure 1 shows, two types of outlying conciliation delegation can
be distinguished. It can consist either of homogeneous outliers (for example
in a conciliation on education policy where all members are more supportive
of this type of policy than the average chamber member) or of bipolar outliers
(for example in a conciliation on labour market policy where there are both
employer and employee interests) where the net result is an unrepresentative
conciliation delegation because one type of interest is more dominant than the
other. The co-decision procedure does not apply to all the areas of EU pork
barrel politics, but it does apply to distributive policy areas such as research
and education policy and even certain questions relating to the structural
funds.
Thirdly, the logic of party theory (Cox and McCubbins, 1993, 1994) would
dictate that the parties act as the principals of the conciliation delegates.
According to Cox and McCubbins (1994: 226), ‘[t]he majority party caucus
adds another layer of structure and process onto the committee structure
studies by Shepsle–Weingast’. Thus, members are bound together in parties
that give them benefits, above all the value of the ‘party label’ when running
for re-election. In return, they support the majority party’s control over key
elements of the chamber’s structure, which leads the chamber to adopt
‘policies that, on average, benefit majority party members more than 
minority party members’ (Cox and McCubbins, 1994: 226). Cox and 
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McCubbins (1993: 2) explain how the committee system is ‘stacked in favour
of majority party interests’. Party leaders ensure that their own delegates
support the party position by having either a representative delegation of the
party on the committee or an extreme one whose views are directly contrary
to those of the minority in order to counterbalance the minority’s views. In
any case, the net result is a committee whose median is situated on the
majority party’s side of the chamber median. This is reinforced by the fact
that the majority party is typically overrepresented in committees compared
with the full House. This is possible because in practice the total number of
seats of a committee and the allocation of seats between parties are deter-
mined by the House majority leadership (Davidson and Oleszek, 2002: 205).
Applying party theory from the US Congress to the EP may seem
inappropriate because of the different nature of the party system and the party
groups. Most importantly, MEPs belong not only to their party group in the
EP but also to their national party, which in terms of re-election makes them
less dependent on the European party groups than the US members are on
theirs. However, European party groups still play a crucial role in securing
assets for their members because they select the crucial spokespersons for
each file (so-called rapporteurs), control committee seat allocations, and so
on. According to Hix et al. (2006: 496), ‘transnational parties in the European
Parliament help national parties and MEPs structure their behavior in much
the same way as parties do in the U.S. Congress’. Hence, members can still
be expected to have clear incentives to follow the party group line. However,
owing to the different nature of the party system (two-party versus multi-
party), it is not possible to speak of a majority party that controls the parlia-
mentary agenda and policies. In certain circumstances one might be able to
speak of a majority coalition between the two large party groups: the PPE
(European People’s Party) and the PSE (Party of European Socialists).
However, this coalition forms only ad hoc for procedural purposes and
consists of legislators with policy positions that are far from coherent.
The PPE and PSE might be able to use their majority of votes to ensure
that they are overrepresented in the conciliation delegation, just as the US
majority party does in the House. However, they are constrained by the
requirement that the formula for the composition of the conciliation del-
egation for a given term be adopted by the presidents of all party groups of
the EP and that it correspond to the political composition of the EP. It is still
possible that the large groups are able to collude and ensure that they are
somewhat overrepresented in the delegation. Hence, because of the different
size of the delegation and the plenary it may not be possible to ensure strict
proportionality in the formula, which leaves some scope for negotiation of
the exact quotas.
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However, whereas the large EP groups may be overrepresented like the
US majority party in the House, the US party theory prediction that political
groups should be able to strategically appoint members with extreme ideo-
logical positions to counterbalance the remaining parties may not hold true
because of the character of the multi-party system in the EP. It is not always
the case that the party groups divide along lines of clear support and oppo-
sition on a given issue. Even if they do, those on the same side would have
to be able to coordinate to ensure a given ideological composition of their
conciliation delegates as a whole, and there is no evidence that they are.
Instead, the most reasonable expectation is that the party groups seek to
appoint members that are representative of the group.
Finally, Conciliation Committees may have responsibility to a fourth prin-
cipal, namely the regional entity that they represent, i.e. the member state.
Hence, being a union of states, it cannot be ruled out that a member state is a
somewhat coherent entity with preferences it seeks to further through
exchanges with other member states. In such a perspective, national members
of the EP can be seen as representatives of different national interests. Member
states could act as principals to Conciliation Committees by influencing their
members and their agendas. For example, recent literature has pointed out
how the national representations in Brussels often lobby their members to
defend certain views within the EP (Farrell and Héritier, 2003: 28). If countries
were important as principals, one might expect that the median position of
conciliation members from a country would be similar to the median position
of all the members from that country in the plenary. Moreover, it could be that
the proportion of members from different countries in conciliation and the full
plenary is similar. However, for several reasons neither of these two outcomes
is very likely in practice in the EP. First, in contrast to the Council, there are
no rules for ensuring geographical representativeness in the EP’s conciliation
delegation. Second, there are no national coordinating bodies of MEPs across
party groups that could pick members with certain policy positions to act as
conciliation delegates. The members from the relevant standing committees
typically serve irrespective of whether they have extreme policy positions 
vis-à-vis their fellow citizens. I would therefore expect any coherence found
between the position of conciliation delegates from a given country and all
delegates from that country in the plenary to be random.
These four different principals are not mutually exclusive. Particular
client interests of the standing committees may overlap with party group
interests, MEPs may align with both their fellow citizens and the EP as a
whole in certain cases, and so on. The analysis should therefore be seen as an
examination not merely of whether but also of the extent to which different
principals matter.5
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Data and measurements
In order to perform the analysis, a data set was gathered from official sources
and the conciliation archives of the EP.6 It includes information on members
of the EP in its fifth session (1999–2004), including 1260 full and 954 substi-
tute delegates on the 86 Conciliation Committees within the period. The tests
for the different principals always involve two questions: (a) is a certain prin-
cipal (standing committee, party group, group of country members in the EP)
overrepresented or underrepresented, and (b) are the policy positions of the
delegates representative of a given principal?
To measure policy positions I use the NOMINATE scores that Hix and
Noury calculated for the EP. NOMINATE scores were originally developed
by Poole and Rosenthal (1997), and they collapse the vote splits in all the roll
calls of a given Congress or parliamentary term into a small number of dimen-
sions. This makes it possible to extract ideal point estimates for each member
of the legislative body.7 Even though NOMINATES exist for more than one
policy dimension, I use the scores for the first dimension because they typi-
cally explain almost all the variation in the voting records. They have been
argued by Hix et al. (2006) to represent an ideological left/right scale.
Problems might arise from using action-based measures such as
NOMINATES to measure policy positions. It has been pointed out that the
voting behaviour of legislators seen in NOMINATES may not be a simple
reflection of their preferences, but may also be influenced by other factors
such as legislative institutions and the opinion of other actors both inside and
outside the EP. Moreover, a substantial number of roll-call votes used for the
estimates are not important votes taken in procedures where the EP has a lot
of power, but are of a more symbolic nature. Finally, the votes taken by roll
call used for the NOMINATE scores might not be a representative sample of
all the votes that take place within the EP (Carruba et al., 2006).
Hoyland (2006) has shown that, even though ideology scores are gener-
ated from all kinds of roll-call votes, not just important ones, they are not
biased. Hence, a new set of scores generated from only important votes show
similar results to the ones found with the existing scores. It is clear that the
criticism of recorded votes perhaps not being representative of all votes in the
EP remains, although it is less weighty here because the study attempts to put
forward absolute statements not on the extent to which parties and standing
committees, etc., are cohesive, but on the extent to which there are relative
differences in the votes of the conciliation delegates and their various princi-
pals. Therefore, as long as conciliation delegates and non-conciliation members
are relatively similar in the possible bias in NOMINATE scores, the relative
differences can be assumed to represent differences in policy positions.
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A criticism that can be levelled at inferring bias from the preferences of
the entire conciliation delegation of the EP is that many compromises are not
really negotiated by these delegations as a whole. However, as I have shown
elsewhere (Rasmussen, 2005), the negotiators from the parliamentary del-
egation are kept on a tight rein by the full delegation to which they have to
report at regular intervals and from which they have to collect mandates
during negotiations. Thus, precisely because these informal compromises
reached in smaller forums have to be adopted by the conciliation delegations
as a whole, one should not just look at the policy position of the key nego-
tiators, but take the policy positions of all conciliation members into account.
Empirical analysis
Chamber principal
The empirical analysis starts by looking at the extent to which conciliation
delegates have policy positions that are representative of their parent
chambers (as informational theory would expect), by using three measures
of ideological representativeness. First, I apply the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney
nonparametric test for independent samples between the delegation and the
chamber for each conciliation procedure. This measure shows that there were
no significant differences between the conciliation delegations and the EP in
any of the 86 conciliation cases. This is of course partly owing to the rela-
tively small n of each conciliation delegation. Secondly, therefore, I also use
another possibility for measuring whether committees are composed of
outliers, as suggested by Krehbiel (1991: 126); i.e. I examine the percentage
share of members in each of the 86 procedures that were located between the
chamber and Conciliation Committee NOMINATE medians. Hence, even
though the illustrations of the empirical observable implications of the differ-
ent theoretical perspectives in Figure 1 give examples of preference distri-
butions, ultimately I am interested not in whether the preferences of the
individuals of the two compared groups of MEPs are more or less dispersed
but in whether the views of the pivotal, decision-making members in these
groups are similar. Since decisions in the EP are taken by majority vote, I look
at the medians of the compared groups. After calculating the percentage share
of members in each of the 86 procedures that were located between the
chamber and Conciliation Committee NOMINATE medians, I calculate the
average share for the 86 procedures. The lower it is, the more representative
the Conciliation Committee is on average. This measure also indicates high
representativeness, since it was as low as 4.09 in the conciliation procedures
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in the period examined and could be an artefact of statistical chance. The third
measure calculates the average numerical distance in the 86 procedures
between the medians of the conciliation delegation and the chamber. The
lower it is, the more representative the delegations are. Here it was as low 
as 0.0735.
A check on committee jurisdiction, not unexpectedly, shows some vari-
ation between areas – ranging from 0.006 to 0.216. However, despite their
variation these average distances are not very high for any committee area.
Moreover, committees from distributive areas do not necessarily have higher
levels of bias than those from areas of more general interest. For example, the
delegations originating from the agriculture and regional committees show
very small average discrepancies, whereas those of delegations from other
committee areas, for example industry, are higher. Official reports from the
EP also confirm that the delegation is typically representative of the EP. For
instance, one document states that ‘[d]espite the biotechnologies episode in
March 19958 . . . confidence in the functioning of Parliament and in the repre-
sentativeness of its delegation to the Conciliation Committee has not been
impaired’ (European Parliament, 1996: 4).
Moreover, having the three permanent members (the three vice presi-
dents, the rapporteur and the relevant committee chairperson) in the con-
ciliation does not affect the level of representativeness. Removing these
members from the calculations does at first increase the level of preference
bias. However, this might be simply because it changes the political balance
in the composition of the delegation: removing these members in effect leads
to underrepresentation of the PPE and PSE groups, which, not surprisingly,
European Union Politics 9(1)1 0 0





Average numerical NOMINATE distance between 
medians in the 86 procedures 0.0735 0.0699
Average percentage share of chamber members 
located between medians in the 86 procedures 4.09% 3.40%
Percentage share of the 86 procedures where the
Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test shows that the
difference is significant below the .05 level 0.0% 0.0%
Note: N = chamber members and 1260 conciliation delegates in 86 conciliation committees.
leads in turn to less representativeness of the plenary as a whole. Hence, in
the period examined, two vice-presidents always came from the PPE group,
one always came from the PSE group and most of the rapporteurs and
committee chairs also came from these two large groups. Instead, I have
checked whether removing the permanent members from a given party
group’s delegation moves its median ideologically closer to the chamber
median.
The analysis shows that the average distances to the chamber median in
the 86 procedures are very similar both for all party group delegates and for
delegates excluding the permanent members. The results are largely the same
whether I remove only the vice-president(s) or also the committee chair-
person and rapporteur from the groups in cases where they hold these posts.
In fact what is striking is that the average distance to the chamber median
becomes even a little smaller for both party groups when their permanent
members are ruled out of the calculation. Hence, these permanent members
do not serve to pull the rest of its party members in conciliation closer to the
chamber median. This does not contradict or support informational theory,
which does not make any predictions about the likely level of preference bias
of individual members compared with the rest of the delegates, but simply
predicts that the preference bias in the delegation as a whole should be low,
as indeed was the case in practice. However, appointing such specialists fits
well with the predictions of informational theory in general. The rapporteur
is likely to have a lot of expertise on the dossier, the relevant committee chair-
person is also likely to be knowledgeable about the issue area, and the vice-
presidents have expertise in conducting negotiations.
Committee principal
Owing to the good fit of informational theory, the predictive power of the
distributional perspective, arguing that delegations should be in line with
outlying standing committees, should be low. If we first examine how well
the standing committees are represented, we find that there was a consider-
able overlap between the number of standing committees and their con-
ciliation delegations in the period examined. Thus, 75 per cent of the full
conciliation members were either full or substitute members of the relevant
standing committee. Furthermore, if we include the three permanent
members of the parliamentary delegation (i.e. the three vice-presidents
responsible for conciliation) who are present no matter in which legislative
area the negotiations are held, then the figure is as high as 92 per cent.9
However, as mentioned, this fits with both distributional and informational
theory.
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Where the theories differ is in the second part of the test, i.e. what they
expect the policy positions of the conciliation delegates to look like compared
with their chamber. Unlike informational theory, distributional theory would
expect the conciliation delegation to consist of preference outliers, just like
the standing committees. Table 1 shows that the policy positions of the con-
ciliation delegates are in fact similar to those of the standing committees of
the EP. Thus, there are no significant differences between the NOMINATES
of the conciliation delegates and of the relevant standing committees in 
any of the 86 procedures. Moreover, the average share of chamber members
in the procedures located between the medians of the conciliation del-
egations and of the standing committees is even smaller than between the
medians of the delegates and the chamber. However, there is no major
divergence between the standing committees and the chamber in the first
place, as distributional theory would expect. Instead, we have a situation
where the median member of the chamber, the standing committees and the
conciliation delegations are similar, which fits the predictions of infor-
mational theory.
Party group principal
Thirdly, I look at the extent to which the party groups act as principals of
the conciliation delegations. First, I examine whether any party groups are
over- or underrepresented. As mentioned, the balance between different
party group members in conciliation is fixed in the formula agreed at the
start of an EP term. To ascertain if the formula was biased, I calculated the
expected number of conciliation delegates given the distribution of seats in
the EP (row 3 in Table 2) and subtracted this figure from the actual distri-
bution (row 2). As can be seen, the level of bias varies between the groups
but is strongest in the PPE and PSE groups. It is clear of course that strict
representativeness cannot be achieved because the fixed number of concili-
ation delegates (15) is not an exact divisor of the total number of EP members
(626). However, this alone cannot explain the bias, because it would actually
be possible to set up a delegation in which the average bias in numerical
terms between the party groups was lower. Such a distribution is shown in
row 5. Compared with the actual distribution, it would remove one seat from
the PSE group and give a full seat to Europe of Nations, so that only Europe
of Democracies and Diversities and the non-attached would share a seat. In
short, it is likely that the big groups used their power to agree on a formula
that overrepresents themselves somewhat in conciliation. Conversely, the
smaller parties were underrepresented, a situation that was aggravated by
the reluctance of the smaller groups to appoint members for their quota at
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the beginning of the period (European Parliament, 2001a: 16). A calculation
involving all conciliation delegates during the fifth term shows that the
differences in the shares of the PPE, PSE, Europe of Nations and non-attached
members in conciliation compared with their shares in the full legislative
body were statistically significant, whereas they were not significant for the
other groups.
Even though this article does not concern the current EP term, it is
interesting to point out here that in the EU27 the large groups are even more
overrepresented because the extreme right and left groups (i.e. the Identity,
Tradition and Sovereignty group and the Independence/Democracy group)
plus the non-attached have been excluded from conciliation work altogether.
This means that both the PPE and the PSE groups have one seat more than
they would have had if strict proportionality between the plenary and the
delegation had applied, and all the other groups except the liberals are 
underrepresented.
Second, I proceed from examining representation to look at whether the
delegates of party groups have similar policy positions to their groups.
Because relatively few members from the smaller groups in the EP sit on
Conciliation Committees, I focus on the PPE and PSE party groups. I again
use the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test, which shows that there were signifi-
cant differences between the policy positions of a party group’s conciliation
delegates and the rest of the group only in four conciliation procedures in the
PPE group and in two procedures in the PSE group (4.7% and 2.3% of the
total number of conciliation procedures, respectively; see Table 3). I also calcu-
lated the average numerical NOMINATE distance in the 86 procedures
between the medians of party group members in the delegation and all party
group members in the chamber. The smaller this average distance is, the more
representative a party group’s conciliation delegates are of the party group.
Moreover, if party delegates hold similar positions to their party group as a
whole, I would expect the NOMINATE distance between them and their
group to be smaller than between them and all EP members.
This is clearly the case in Table 3. On average there is a lot of similarity
between the NOMINATE medians of the party group as a whole and those
members of the group that sat on the Conciliation Committees in the 86
procedures, whereas the distances between a party’s conciliation delegates
and the EP median are much larger. The distance between the full party 
group and its members is smallest in the PPE group, but it is small for both
political groups.
In short, the predictions of the adapted version of US party theory about
the composition of the conciliation delegation performed well. There was a
small overrepresentation of the two biggest groups in the fifth EP term and
Rasmussen The EU Conciliation Committee 1 0 3




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































a high coherence between the policy position of the party group delegates
and the group as a whole in the plenary. Taking into account that party groups
are likely to be somewhat constrained in appointing a representative del-
egation by having only a few members in each delegation, as well as having
to respect the practice that most members come from the relevant standing
committee and that the rapporteur, chairperson and three vice-presidents
responsible for conciliation are always appointed, the ideological cohesion
found between them and their conciliation members is remarkably high.
Country principal
Finally, I estimate the extent to which conciliation members act as agents of
their fellow national members in the EP. Firstly, I examine whether countries
are represented in a similar way in the delegations and in the chamber
(Table 4). Starting with the big countries, the proportions of Germans in
conciliation and in the chamber are almost equal, the British are over-
represented, and the French, Italians and Spaniards are underrepresented.
Among the smaller countries, the Netherlands, Sweden and Greece are over-
represented, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal are underrepresented, and
Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Finland lie somewhere in between. Statisti-
cal tests involving all conciliation delegates in the period show that for 9 of
the 15 countries there are significant differences between the proportion of
full conciliation delegates and the entire EP. The figures underline that strict
national representation might in practice be impossible to achieve. Hence,
member states with a relatively high share of members in the two large groups
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Table 3 How representative are the conciliation delegates of their party groups?
Party group PPE PSE
Average numerical NOMINATE distance in the 86 procedures 
between medians of party group members of the delegation
and party group members of the entire chamber 0.0239 0.0278
Percentage share of the 86 procedures where the
Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test shows that the
difference is significant below the .05 level 4.7% 2.3%
Average numerical NOMINATE distance in the 86 procedures
between medians of party group members of the delegation
and the entire chamber 0.4836 0.4007
Note: N = chamber members and 946 PPE and PSE conciliation delegates in 86 conciliation
committees.
and committees that often go to conciliation are also likely to be over-
represented here.
One possibility for national members to use the Conciliation Committee
strategically to promote national interests would be to attempt to become
overrepresented in delegations that negotiate cases where national interests
play a large role and that are of vital interest to their country. Two such
examples are the resale rights directive (COD 1996 85) and the first takeover
proposal (COD 1995 341). In the first of these, national differences in whether
and how resale rights for artists were already recognized were important, and
a closer examination of my data shows that MEPs from countries in favour
of EU-wide resale rights (for example Germany and Spain) were over-
represented in the delegation. On takeovers, the Commission (2002: 9) has
also pointed out that one reason the conciliation text failed to get confirmed
by the plenary was that the delegation overrepresented German, UK and
Spanish members even though differences in national corporate culture were
at stake. Hence, in a subset of cases where national differences cut across party
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Table 4 Country representation in the EP
Conciliation
Country delegates (No.) Share (%) EP share (%)
Austria 44 3.49 3.35
Belgium 43 3.41 3.99
Denmark 37 2.94 2.56
Finland 26 2.06 2.56
Francea 132 10.48 13.90
Germany 199 15.79 15.81
Greecea 85 6.75 3.99
Irelanda 19 1.51 2.40
Italy 151 11.98 13.90
Luxembourga 2 0.16 0.96
Netherlandsa 107 8.49 4.95
Portugala 20 1.59 3.99
Spaina 94 7.46 10.22
Swedena 76 6.03 3.51
United Kingdoma 225 17.86 13.90
Total 1260 100.00 100.00
Note:
a The difference between the share of conciliation members and members in the chamber is
significant below the .05 level.
lines, MEPs from affected countries may be able to place themselves stra-
tegically in conciliation. However, whether they succeed depends on how
many members from a country who have the relevant expertise sit on the
relevant standing committee, etc. Moreover, having a disproportionate share
of the conciliation delegates is not necessarily enough also to exert a dispro-
portionate influence on the policy, because conciliations are kept under tight
control by the chamber (Rasmussen, 2005). Finally, even though MEPs from
countries with a high stake in a proposal may succeed in getting over-
represented, it is likely that some of these will have views that balance each
other out, so that the delegation is still representative of the full plenary. This
was the case, for example, in the takeover proposal mentioned. Despite the
fact that the conciliation delegation adopted the deal and the plenary rejected
it, the votes in both the plenary and the delegation were very similar, i.e. a
perfect, or very close to, two-way split (European Parliament, 2001a: 14).
The second stage of the test looks at how representative the policy
positions of the conciliation members from a given country were of all the
members from that country in the full legislative body. Small countries have
not necessarily had a lot of members who have served in conciliation, so I
limited the calculation to the big countries. The figures in Table 5 show that
there is a certain degree of coherence between conciliation delegates and their
national groups as a whole. Only in Italy and the United Kingdom are signifi-
cant differences found in a very small minority of the conciliation procedures
between the members from a country in the EP and the country’s members
appointed as conciliation delegates. Again, however, it would be unrealistic
to expect a lot of significant differences because each country has only a small
n on each conciliation delegation.
Instead, I look at the average numerical NOMINATE distance in the
procedures between the medians of conciliation members from a given
country and all country members in the EP. The smaller this distance is, the
more representative conciliation delegates are of their country. The calculations
show that there is some discrepancy, especially for Italy. Moreover, it can be
seen that the average numerical distances are generally much larger than those
between the conciliation delegates and any of their other potential principals
examined here. This reflects the fact that no national groups cut across the
parties within the EP and thus also no ‘country coordinators’ within the
standing committees who could control the ideological position of the
members from a given country are appointed as conciliation delegates. Thus,
if a country is represented by either high-demand or low-demand members
in comparison with a country median, this is likely to be by accident.
In fact, the distance between the median of the conciliation delegates from
a given country and the median of all country members in the EP is typically
Rasmussen The EU Conciliation Committee 1 0 7
similar to the distance between the median of the country’s conciliation del-
egates and the chamber median. Of the five countries, Germany is the only
one with a clear trend showing that the median of the conciliation delegates
is on average closer to that of all German MEPs than to the chamber median.
For Italy, the result is the exact opposite: the conciliation delegates are on
average closer to the chamber median than to that of all Italian MEPs. For the
UK, France and Spain, the delegates are approximately as close to the chamber
median as to the median of their country members in the EP. Measured on
the left/right scale, it is thus not the case that MEPs from certain member
states in conciliation, and the rest of the chamber, have coherent ideological
positions.
Defenders of a national perspective might argue that it is not reasonable
to use a left/right scale to assess national representativeness, but that national
MEPs may be cohesive in another dimension such as pro-/anti-European
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Table 5 How representative are the conciliation delegates of their fellow country
members in the EP?
Country Germany Spain France Italy UK
Average numerical 
NOMINATE distance in the
procedures between 
medians of country 
members in the 
delegation and country 
members in the entire 
chamber 0.2529 0.4433 0.3385 0.5770 0.3990
Percentage share of 
delegations where the 
Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney
test shows that the 
difference is significant
below the .05 level. 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.3% 4.7%
Average numerical 
NOMINATE distance in the
procedures between 
medians of country 
members in the delegation
and all EP members 0.3292 0.4284 0.3346 0.3191 0.3876
Note: N = chamber members and 801 conciliation delegates from Germany, Spain, France, Italy
and the UK in 86 conciliation procedures.
integration. The argument would be that in harmonization of internal market
measures, for example, MEPs with similar national regulation have similar
policy views. To ascertain whether this holds, I conducted the same analysis
for the second-dimension NOMINATES, which according to Hix et al. (2006)
have been used to represent government–opposition conflicts as well pro-
/anti-Europe attitudes. Even in this dimension, however, the average
NOMINATE distance in the 86 procedures between a party group and its
conciliation delegates is still considerably lower than the distance between
conciliation members from a given country and all country members in the
plenary.
Conclusion
The EU Conciliation Committee has received very little attention in academic
literature, despite its ability to present take-it-or-leave-it offers to its parent
legislative bodies at the end of the legislative process and the fact that it
negotiates important legislation with substantial effects on EU citizens. This
analysis gives us some first insights into the interests of the potential princi-
pals who comprise the EU Conciliation Committee. Only the EP delegation
was examined, because the Council delegation cannot reasonably be expected
to have an incentive to deviate from the overall position of the Council.
In the EP, the tests for the different principals involved two key ques-
tions: (a) is a certain group (standing committee, party group, group of
country members in the EP) overrepresented or underrepresented, and (b)
are the policy positions of the delegates representative of a given principal?
Looking at representation, the share of MEPs from different countries was
random, whereas there was a systematic overrepresentation in conciliation of
members of the previous standing committees as well as some overrepresen-
tation of the big party groups. However, a look at the policy positions reveals
that these overrepresentations do not lead to any distortions in the policy
composition of the conciliation delegation. The overrepresentation of the two
largest groups is not very strong and the PPE and the PSE groups balance
each other out because they are at opposite ends of the policy scale. Moreover,
the overrepresentation of the standing committees does not play a large role
because these committees are representative of the EP itself. Thus, it was
shown that distributional theory did not have any explanatory power,
whereas informational theory performed well in predicting the composition
of the EP conciliation delegation, which was typically only marginally biased.
Moreover, despite the EU being a union of states, there was also no evidence
that conciliation delegates represent the policy views of all members of their
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country as a whole. Instead, the representational ratios and ideological
composition of the EP conciliation delegation ensure that the delegates repre-
sent both their party groups and the chamber as whole. Therefore, the option
to go to conciliation should not generally be seen as a risky means for the EP
to reach agreement. The EP and the Council may still wish to try to avoid
going to conciliation. However, this is more likely to be motivated by other
reasons such as to save time and energy by concluding early in the legis-
lative process than by a fear that going to conciliation involves the risk that
the delegates will shift the legislative outcomes away from their preferences.
There might be several reasons why the EP’s conciliation delegation is
not more biased than it is. Rasmussen (2005) points to the effectiveness of the
appointment rules. This is confirmed here. Thus, we saw that, even though
there is no rule similar to that of the US House of Representatives requiring
that the majority of the conciliation delegates previously supported the EP
position, this is the case in practice. The analysis showed that the party groups
do not send party outliers to conciliation but send members who are repre-
sentative of the group as a whole. There may be additional reasons the EP
conciliation delegation is as representative as it is. First, the EP has no need
to appoint an extreme delegation to try to counterbalance an extreme Council
delegation. As mentioned, the Council delegation is composed in such a way
that it is never extreme. It is the Council. One might think that a parliament
could still try to appoint an extreme delegation to move the Council towards
its end of the continuum, but here the EP is a special case.
Hence, a second reason the EP does not appoint an extreme delegation
is that this would create the risk that the compromises agreed with the
Council would not get adopted by the plenary afterwards. Hence, ordinary
MEPs are not likely to be able to see a strategic advantage in having an
extreme delegation, but rather are likely to react negatively if they find out
that conciliation delegates are defending more extreme points than those
agreed in the second reading amendments of the EP. If too many conciliation
compromises failed to get adopted by the EP plenary, there would be a real
risk that it would not be regarded as a serious partner to negotiate with, which
could have consequences for the willingness of the member states to extend
the scope of co-decision. This emerges very clearly in one of the EP’s own
reports, which states: ‘The credibility and representativeness of the delegation
have been one of Parliament’s assets, even in cases where the Conciliation
Committee attendance of MEPs has been limited’ (European Parliament, 1999:
6–7). Moreover, it would not be the first time that the EP has decided to restrict
itself in order to act effectively in inter-institutional negotiations, which is for
example also the case with restrictions that it has taken on when tabling
second reading amendments (European Parliament, 2005: rule 62).
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comments on an earlier draft.
1 The country in charge of the six-month rotating EU presidency is represented
by the minister responsible for the area being negotiated.
2 Typically, a qualified majority if the European Commission supports the EP’s
amendments, otherwise unanimity. There are currently three Treaty articles
where unanimity in the Council is always required. Article 251 of the Treaty
sets out the co-decision procedure.
3 The Treaty merely states that a joint text has to be adopted by a majority
(emphasis added) of the EP representatives, and it is unclear whether this
means a simple or an absolute majority. After the failure of the takeover direc-
tive, however, the legal service of the EP clarified that the delegation needs
not merely a simple but an absolute majority to adopt the joint text (European
Parliament, 2001a: 15).
4 Both interviews were conducted in September 2004.
5 The approach adopted by other authors, namely of testing the theories against
each other, has been adopted here too. However, note that, strictly speaking,
their assumptions on policy context are incompatible in some respects. For
example, informational theory assumes a one-dimensional policy space,
whereas distributional theory assumes multiple dimensions to which actors
attach different salience.
6 The names of the parliamentary conciliation delegates have been obtained
from the archives of the EP’s Conciliation Secretariat. Because substitute
members in the EP do not have voting rights unless the full members cannot
participate, they are not included in the tables here.
7 I use the W-NOMINATE score even though it is non-dynamic (i.e. the actual
scores cannot be compared over time between different Parliaments or
between different legislative bodies), which is not a problem here where I
look at only one legislative body and one term.
8 Biotechnology (COD 1994 159) refers to the only file in the fourth session of
the EP (1994–9) that was rejected by the plenary of the EP after a conciliation
report had been agreed with the Council.
9 Information about the composition of the EP’s standing committees was
gathered from European Parliament (2001b).
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